THE PIMA REVOLT OF 1751

CHAPTER V: 

111Spanish blood did run red on the night of November 20-21 in 1751, and the blood of survivors ran cold.

At Saric, Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua managed his share of the initial uprising with typical imagination and efficiency. He informed the mission personnel that an Apache attack impended, and suggested everyone take refuge in his home. Around a score of Spaniards and Indian servants did so, and the Piman leader stationed armed guards around the house and fired it. Those who did not burn to death inside died under the war clubs of the guards when they tried to escape. The mission overseer escaped, but deserted his wife and children (Ewing 1945:261). Four Spanish men, four youths; two women and nine children died, along with a mestizo and two Yaquis (Libro de Entierros de San Ygnacio....de 1697), for a total of twenty-two dead at Saric.

An eager-beaver type acculturated neophyte warned the priest at Tubutama of the planned revolt, and he got word of the crisis to the Saric Jesuit who rode off without displaying much concern as to the fate of anyone save himself. The Tubutama contingent forted up and held the rebels at bay with the loss of three men until the survivors slipped away on the night of November 22 (Ewing 1945:262-263).

112For some reason one Spanish family at nearby Ati had not been warned in time, and Garcia and his wife and child died there (Libro de Entierros de San Ygnacio....de 1697).

Farther west the northern Piman rebels enjoyed uniformly bloody success. They wiped out the hated user of stocks at Caborca, the missionary Tello (Ewing 1945:263) and ten others, mostly children (Libro de Entierros de San Ygnacio...de 1697). At the Busani visita six Spaniards, three Yaquis and one Opata were massacred (ibid.). Upriver at the Pitiquito visita six Spaniards and a Yaqui died at the hands of the rebels. Farther upstream at Oquitoa five Spaniards departed this life with one Mulato youth and a Níxora slave. At the mine camp near Oquitoa the death toll was nineteen: eighteen Spaniards including three women and six children, and one Yaqui (ibid.).

Out in the desert on the short Sonoita river, another Jesuit fond of corporal punishment paid with his life for the indignities he had inflicted on neophytes, and the rebels dispatched his foreman and a servant to keep him company in purgatory (Ewing 1945:264).

At other civilian settlements, a family of four perished at Agua Caliente (Libro de Entierros de San Ygnacio....de 1697) and the slaughter at Aribaca was considerable (Ewing 1945:264). There four Spanish men, three Spanish women and four Spanish children died, accompanied by one mestizo, a Yaqui couple and a Níxora slave (Libro de Entierros de San Ygnacio de 1697).

When the Spaniards counted noses back at Santa Ana and the mission of San Ignacio, they found that the death toll113numbered at least 105 persons. Two German Jesuit missionaries had rendered account for their corporal punishment of mission Indians. Eighty-eight Spaniards paid the price of pioneering in Indian country-thirty-six men, fifteen women and thirty-seven children. Two mestizos were caught in the holocaust and died. So did one Mulato youth. So did nine Yaquis, an Opata and a pair of Níxora slaves. Other Yaquis were taken prisoner by the rebel northern Pimans.

There had been a grim reckoning for the carefree years of conversion.The Pima Revolt reminded the Spaniards most unpleasantly of the successful Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico in 1680. Once again a native Indian leader had achieved strategic surprise, despite efforts on the part of "loyal" mission Indians to warn Spaniards of impending doom. Once again native leaders filling Spanish-created and Spanish-sanctioned offices had united across wide distances to rebel in concert at an agreed-upon time. Once again the Indians who seemed to have made the most progress in learning and practicing Spanish customs officered a successful surprise attack on unsuspecting Spaniards too complacent to listen to warnings proffered them by sympathetic Pimans. Once again Spanish men, women and children had died on what had been considered a firmly subdued frontier.

While New Mexico proper had finally been reconquered in 1692, it had required twelve years of strenuous military effort and several punitive expeditions before the province 114could be recolonized. Even yet the isolated Hopi towns remained independent as they had been since 1680 even though Spaniards had been attempting to reach them from the northern Piman country during the 1740's only to be frustrated by the advancing Apache refugees from the Plains (Bancroft 1884:I:536). In this situation, shudders ran up and down the spines of every surviving Spaniard on the margins of northern Piman country.

Every Spaniard left in the area could expect Piman raids on his home and family unless the rebellion were immediately repressed. Moreover, every arms-bearing Spaniard and particularly every official, knew that higher officials all the way up to the king in Spain could be expected to light fires under his nervous posterior for, first of all, having permitted this catastrophe to occur, and second for not having squelched the rebels immediately.

Since there are adequate narratives of the progress of the suppression of the Pima Revolt already in print (Ewing 1938:1945) the present discussion of the rebellion will be restricted to events at Tubac which have not been published.

A. Tubac's Role in the Pima Revolt

The Pimans of Tubaca were located at the edge of the centre of the nativistic movement of the northern Pimans. Luís Oacpicagigua, the most effective leader in all northern Piman history probably, started the uprising at his home town of 114Saric. Messengers from Luís carried word to the other principal settlements of the day on which all were to rise in concert to take the hated Spaniards by surprise.

Two of the Spanish farm supervisors most disliked by the Tubaca area Indians had been in Tubac a few days before, but on November 20 they were elsewhere. Father Garrucho's general foreman Juan María Romero "Squash Squabble" infamy died at Aribaca along with his wife and son. So did a second Spanish participant in the "Squash Squabble", the foolish lancer Joseph de Nava (Sedelmayr, Estiger & Nentuig Nov. 30, 1751:67).

1. War Clubs in the Morning

At Tubac itself the revolt turned out to be somewhat of a fiasco. The Indians waited until daylight instead of attacking the local Spaniards during the dark of night. Then the Spanish-style officials of Tubac Indian town, led by their governor, assaulted the lone Spaniard with their native war clubs (Romero Dec. 3, 1751:82v). Said mission ranch supervisor Juan de Figueroa succeeded in fighting off his attackers and fleeing wounded toward Guebavi. He was still running when he reached Guebavi with the first news the people at the mission had of the revolt (Ygnacio Oct. 15, 1754:77v). They promptly fled to the hills with their weapons.

During the excitement of the attack on Juan de Figueroa, a friendly Piman hid his wife from the rebels so she was able to escape unhurt. The Spanish custom of acting as godparents 116to baptized Indian infants stood her in good stead, for her Indian savior was a compadre of hers (Sedelmayr, Estiger & Nentuig, Nov. 30, 1751:67) who clearly lived up to his Catholic ritual kinship obligations at the expense of his tribal loyalty. Figueroa's flight while his wife yet lived bespeaks an instinct for self-preservation under stress not condoned by the honor system of colonial Spaniards of the time, to whom honor was their dearest possession, even more so than life itself. Chances are that Figueroa was just a poor peasant farmer trying to improve his lot on the frontier, and an atypically pusillanimous sort at that. In his defense be it noted that the foreman at Saric also saved himself while his wife and children perished (Ewing 1945:261).

Apparently the Tubaca natives took out some of their spite on the possessions of the Spaniards before they departed from their homes. At any rate, the church and house belonging to the priest were burned (Fontes Dec. 17, 1751: 19v) and the rebels very likely set the torch to them when they attacked Figueroa.

2. Second Thoughts

The Tubac Indians themselves carried news of the uprising north down the Santa Cruz River Valley to the great village at Bac. The captain and some principal medicine men began urging the assassination of the local Jesuit missionary, but the governor managed to urge Father Francisco Pauer on his way before the final decision was reached by the slow 117process of northern Piman town-meeting (Chrisptoval Oct. 19 1754:87v).

Very soon after the unpropitious beginning of their own rebellion, the Indians of Tubaca packed up and moved to Tres Alamos on the lower San Pedro River, where they were joined by their neighbors from Tumacacori who had departed from their homes on receiving word of the uprising from Guebavi (Phelipe Oct. 15, 1754:79). A couple of other smallrancherías also took refuge at Tres Alamos. There the people of Tubac seem to have remained through the winter, although they may have joined Captain-General Oacpicagigua's force in the Santa Catalina mountains.

The flight of the Tubac population effectively scotched at least some of the strategy which Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua had evolved in preparing for the revolt. He had suggested to his kinsman Pedro de Chihuahua that the latter go establish himself among the Spaniards living in the San Luís Valley prior to the revolt. Then Luís would send him word afterwards to withdraw to Tubac where Luís would await him (Padilla, Feb. 3, 1752:25). In the event, Tubac turned out to be quite unsuitable as a rendezvous and Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua kept to the mountains with his forces most of the time. His instructions to Pedro, even though that ex-lieutenant of his denied any intention of following them, (ibid., f. 30) sealed Pedro's death warrant when he was arrested on orders from Father Ignacio X. Keller (Menocal Dec. 2, 1751:9-11) who took command of troops and militiamen with 118much more of the iron hand of the Prussian officer than the humble soul of a missionary priest. Captain-General Oacpicagigua apparently continued to regard the site of Tubac as an excellent rendezvous point, since he suggested to the reluctant rebels of Bac that they unite with him at Tubac or Sopori (Ruiz de Ael, Dec. 17, 1751:l8).

3. On Active Service

Several Tubac warriors joined Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua's forces. One Tubac resident named Gabrec reportedly ventured into Apache country to invite those Indians to join the northern Piman rebels in fighting the Spaniards (Joachín Jan. 8, 1752:68). The western rebels were reported to have tried to interest the Seris in a similar anti-Spanish alliance, but the gist of the response from both tribes was that the Pimas were hardly in a position to request their aid after having killed their relatives in concert with the Spaniards (ibid.).

The same Joseph of Tubac who had suffered the lashes of Father Joseph Garrucho's juryless justice for leaving Tubac without leave to accompany Captain-General Luís to fight Apaches and Seris was apparently one of the prime movers in the revolt (Buptucquim, Tubaasan, Tuthuburi & Siarisan, Feb. 23, 1752:116v), as might have been expected of a stalwart warrior who had been so grievously wronged.

The pre-revolt mador of Tubac was part of a multitude assembled at Bac in January of 1752 (Ruiz de Ael, Jan. 16, 1752:48), 119which probably included a good many more Tubac men working on the backward rebels of Bac.

B. Tracks In the Dust

While the people of Tubac waited out the rebellion in the north, their home town was not left entirely deserted. There was in fact considerable traffic through the place from time to time.

The native alcalde of the ranchería of Huachuca passed through seeking his relatives who had lived at Guebavi (Fontes Dec. 17, 1751:19v). Apparently a division of Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua's warrior horde operating toward the royal fort at Terrenate completed the incineration of the prerevolt ranchería sometime early in December (Ruiz de Ael, Dec. 17, 1751:18v). Two days after Christmas Ensign Joseph de Fontes arrived at Tubac from Terrenate fort. Finding fresh tracks, he hoped to locate the local Indians, but discovered only one Pasqual, an ambassador from Father Ignacio X. Keller to the rebels according to his story, with a female relative and child. Not quite trusting the Indian, Fontes invited him to continue on with his column, not quite in the quality of a prisoner. Before long Pasqual broke loose and Fontes' men were unable to catch him. The woman told the Ensign that the Indians of Cocóspera and Suamca were living in the Santa Rita mountains east of Tubac, and he released her with her horse to go tell them he would do them no harm since they 120were not among the active rebels (Fontes Dec. 25, 1751:48v-49).

C. The Spanish Camp at Tubac

As spring approached in 1752, the rebel northern Pimans began to repent their hasty flight from their fertile river bottom fields, and the patience and forbearance of Governor Diego Ortíz Parrilla began to pay off in peace.

The military failure of the rebels had been quite clear to everyone concerned ever since their defeat on the field of Aribaca on January 4 when approximately 2,000 northern Pimans attacked less than one hundred Spaniards only to be repulsed with a loss of forty-three dead (Ewing 1945:273). There remained the problem of negotiating a peace with honor from the Piman point of view, possibly salvaging some of the goals the Indians rebelled for, and a permanent peace with sovereignty from the Spanish point of view. With such ends in mind, Governor Ortíz Parrilla sent Captain Joseph Díaz del Carpio north with yet another expeditionary force in early March. His provisions running short on March 6, Captain Díaz del Carpio decided to encamp at a favorable spot to await events and send to his post for more supplies (Díaz del Carpio Mar. 6-24, 1752:31v). He accordingly went into camp at Tubac on the seventh, and sent a detachment to Terrenate after food.

121Most days passed with only the dull routine of camp life to occupy the troops. Occasionally something happened to liven the monotony, as when three Indians came into camp on the ninth to inquire whether they could safely return to their home at Imuris, a visita of San Ignacio Mission. Captain Díaz del Carpio assured then that they could pass (ibid., f. 32).

On the fourteenth orders arrived from Governor Ortíz Parrilla to dispatch another embassy to Captain-General Luís urging him to surrender. The loyal Indians sent to Luís were instructed to tell him the governor's patience was wearing thin, and any further delay in the mountains by Luís with a force under arms would be taken as evidence that he did not sincerely desire peace, but intended to maintain his rebellion. Luís was to be warned that Captain Díaz del Carpio would not leave the north country until Luís surrendered (ibid., f. 32v-33v).

1. A Captain-General Surrenders

Nothing of note happened for four days after the Indians departed on the fourteenth, but finally on the eighteenth day of March in 1752 the Spanish military encampment at Tubac became the scene of the final sad act in the Pima Revolt.

As Captain Díaz del Carpio (ibid., f. 33v-34) reported wryly to Governor Diego Ortíz Parrilla:

in the evening at sunset said Captain Don Luís 122arrived at this town alone, and having come into my presence, knelt at my feet with much humility and respect and spoke to me in his tongue through the interpreter, all the troops being present.

He said that with the last message which I had sent him, he had decided to surrender, believing with all his heart in the charity with which he was looked upon; and that he asked mercy for the ill which hemay have wrought, but if I were unable to pardon him, he was now rendered to be done with as might be wished....

Thus one brave man walked alone into the enemy camp at Tubac and brought the hopeless Pima Revolt of 1751 to its formal end. Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua offered himself in sacrifice and atonement for his whole people, endeavoring to spare them the consequences of their all too efficient uprising.

Captain Díaz del Carpio considered Luís to be a man of his word, rebel though he may have been. Díaz gave the defeated Indian leader a good horse and sent him back to the Santa Catalina Mountains on March 19 to talk to his followers who were still hiding and urge them to come down to their rancherías (ibid., f. 34v).

The defeated Indian leader promised to execute this commission within three days, and true to his word returned at ten a.m. on March 22 with his wife and three children. He 123reported to Captain Díaz del Carpio that the Indians in the Catalinas had started for their homes and he himself was ready to be taken before the governor. Therefore, the Spanish commander broke camp and rode south toward San Ignacio that same day (ibid., f. 35).

With his departure from Tubac, the Pima Revolt was to all intents and purposes ended. The recriminations which followed between Jesuits, Indians and civil officials, the endless hearings investigating the causes of the uprising, these were all epilogue. The critical decisions had been made and the nativistic movement of 1751 had dissipated in the cold light of reality.

2. Geopolitical Consequences of Luís's Surrender

The military situation in northern Sonora remained very delicately balanced even after the decisive defeat of the Piman rebels at Aribaca by the Spaniards under Lt. Bernardo de Urrea. The Apache and Seri threats remained very real and pressing, and Governor Diego Ortíz Parrilla could not tie up troops and militia too long on the northern Piman front without yielding ground elsewhere. Moreover, he was only an interim governor subject to relief at any moment, and a new governor probably would institute a new policy.

As night fell on March 18, 1752, one of the turning points of history had been rounded. For on the shoulders of the northern Piman Captain-General rode the course of 124empires beyond his ken. His wise surrender timed as it was insured the success of Governor Ortíz Parrilla's pacification policy. Had Luís Oacpicagigua chosen to try to preserve his own life by staying in the hills, Ortíz Parrilla could not long have maintained his handsoff policy, and the chaffing Spanish hounds of war would have been unleashed to wreck vengeance on the northern Pimans. Had that happened, the history of the farther Southwest would have been materially changed.

The butchery of the Spanish soldiery following the small scale uprising at Tubutama and Caborca in 1695 when only one Spanish Jesuit died would have paled into insignificance beside the massacre of northern Pimans which would have occurred had Ortíz Parrilla been removed on the grounds of the cowardice and stupidity he was accused of by Sonorans, and the race-haughty Spanish cavaliers been released to wield sword and lance among the northern Pimans to exact vengeance for the eightyeight Spaniards whom the Indians had slain in the first days of the revolt.

The bloody drama of the conquest of Tenochtitlan would have been repeated in all the northern Piman rancherías, and the surviving population would have been reduced far faster than even the infectious epidemics which were decimating these Indians could carry them off. In all likelihood, the fighting potential of the northern Pimans would have been utterly destroyed.

125What would then have occurred is easy to predict: the rapacious southern Athapascans would have speedily mopped up the remnants of northern Piman population left by the Spaniards. The Apaches would have moved quickly into the population vacuum created, bringing them to the shores of the Colorado River and the Gulf of California. There they would have linked up with the Yuma Indians who were hostile to the Gila River Pimas (who would by that time have been exterminated) and with the Seris. Such a juncture of tribes hostile to the Spaniards would have soon converted northwestern Sonora into a battle ground no Spanish force could hold longer than it took a column of cavalry to ride past a given point.

The long range effects of such a situation would have been tremendous. The Spanish expeditions overland to California which forestalled a southward Russian advance at a critical time would have been impossible. The Spanish advance from Lower into Upper California would probably have been stopped by its inherent weakness plus depredations by Apaches and Yumas operating west of the Colorado River. Thus, California would have been colonized by Russia.

The difference Russian occupation of California would have made in world affairs is also tremendous. Russian traders probably would have traded firearms and munitions to the Apaches for use against the Spaniards. Had the southern Atha-pascans ever acquired a sure supply of trade goods on their western flank they would have been unstoppable in New Spain. 126Using only such firearms as they could capture in raids, they managed to depopulate a wide strip of northern Sonora in the middle nineteenth century. With an adequate supply of trade guns in the middle seventeenth century, they would have pushed the Spaniards far back toward the City of Mexico.

A Russian California would have had additional repercussions in world politics. The west coast of North America would have been closed to AngloAmericans. The British and United States ventures at the mouth of the Columbia River would not have been tolerated by a Russian Empire maintaining a supply line to California. The gold which would have been discovered eventually would have brought a rush of Russians to California rather than North Americans. This would have insured that the North Pacific became a Russian puddle.

Moreover the Indian situation which would have been created by Russian occupation of California would have effectively shut off the United States from the west coast, and the vaunted "Manifest Destiny" of this nation would have carried it only to the Rocky Mountains at the farther limits of President Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase.

The Russian-armed southern Athapascans would have blocked all the southern approaches to California. American emigrants to the gold fields via the southern route along the Gila River had a hard enough time of it under the conditions which existed in 1849 and later years. Even so, they had the advantage of a base on U. S. territory as close as the Rio 126Grande River in New Mexico, and provisioning stations at the Mexican towns of Santa Cruz and Tucson in northern Sonora and the stalwart Gila River Pimas and Maricopas who produced a large surplus of food for the improvident forty-niners and helpful Yumas at the Colorado Crossing to swim stock across. Had any one of those crutches for limping emigrant trains been lacking, the American emigration would have been seriously hindered and the death toll would have mounted.

Without friendly Indians at the Colorado Crossing, the emigrants would have been stymied-emigration on the road across northern Arizona was in fact not possible until the United States Army pacified the Mohaves who held the Needles Crossing. Without the maize and melons and beans of the Pimas and Maricopas on the Gila River many emigrants would have starved in the Colorado desert even if they crossed the Colorado, and some would have starved on the lower Gila. Without provisions from Tucson, more would have starved, and some would never have made the Gila River before their stock gave out. Without provisions from Santa Cruz, many could never have made Tucson, and so on. With all these places non-existent, civilian emigration across southern Arizona and northern Sonora would have been impossible.

Add to the absence of resting places and provisioning points a large hostile population of well-armed Indians such as the Apaches would have been with Russian trade guns, even U. S. military penetration to California via the southern 128route would have been impossible. Colonel Kearny's command would have left its bones whitening the canyons of the upper Gila River, had it progressed that far. Wellarmed Apaches could have turned back on the New Mexican settlements and taken that province for their own, keeping the United States on the Plains.

Finally, Russian traders would have penetrated the mountain trails into the Rockies, supplying Indians there with desirable goods including firearms. The trade frontier would have developed into a screen of warring tribes as it did everywhere else in North America. So instead of meek pacifists the intermontane Indians who greeted the first American explorers would have been bloodthirsting warriors. The famous Mountain Men would have had much less chance of following the beaver to California and there could have been no sizeable American colony built up there to stage a Bear Flag revolt.

In short, but for the very great selflessness of an obscure northern Piman Indian called Luís Oacpicagigua and the strange-for-a-Spaniard forbearance of Governor Diego Ortíz Parrilla, the United States and Canada west of the Rockies would today probably be an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with a sizeable Athapascan enclave reading its own ethnic literature developed with the assistance of linguists from the Ethnographic Institute in Moscow. Apache and Navaho delegates would sit in the national Congress of the Communist Party.

129The United States of America would be contained east of the Rocky Mountains if it still existed. The United States of Mexico would be an attenuated banana republic or a Soviet satellite state.

In fact, these nations might not even exist: speculation as to the course of world history in recent times with a Russian Empire in North America and greatly reduced United States and Canadian land areas would be futile beyond the obvious conclusion that the dynamics of world affairs would have been quite different.

Would there have been a Sino-Japanese war had Russia possessed a North Pacific Fleet guarding a North American Empire? Would there have been a Japanese-Russian War? Would there have even been a modern Japanese nation had the United States been cut off from the Pacific Coast?

Presumably the Russian Revolutions would have occurred regardless of North American empire, although it is barely possible that an overseas colony might have absorbed the energy of the dissatisfied Russians. Would a smaller and weaker Canada and United States have been able to swing the balance during World War I? World War II could not even have occurred in the form that it did with no United States empire in the Pacific Ocean.

Certainly Luís Oacpicagigua and Diego Ortíz Parrilla belong high on the list of historical figures who have performed great disservice to the Apache Indians and the Communist Party as heir to the Russian Tsars.

D. Return of the Natives

Whatever assurances Captain-General Luís Oacpicagigua may have given his followers in the Santa Catalina Mountains as to the peaceable intentions of the Spanish troops poised at the margins of northern Pimeria were apparently quite effective in persuading those Indians to return to their homes. A winter in the wilds without the comforts of accustomed houses and food stores and scenery had probably robbed the nativistic movement of most of its attraction by that time anyhow. The Indians were probably tired of short rations of hard-to-collect wild foods, and longing for their rich fields, so the approach of spring and maize-bean- squash planting time must have had them fidgeting uneasily and casting longing glances down the mountain slopes toward the silver thread of the Santa Cruz River in the hazy distance.

Less than a month after Luís surrendered at Tubac, forty of the natives of that ranchería had returned to their homes, and were probably busily engaged in preparing their fields and planting when Captain Joseph Díaz del Carpio swung through the Santa Cruz River Valley again in mid-April and enumerated them in the course of his inspection of the result of the pacification of the rebel northern Pimans (Díaz del Carpio, Apr. 14 ff., 1752:93v-94).

Needless to say, the town officers who had led the attack on Juan de Figueroa had been deposed and new ones appointed. 131The forty returnees were only a part of the total population of the ranchería, others returning later.

The new governor at Tubac was Juan Antonio Tuburuca. His wife Ines and son Andres returned to Tubac with him for spring planting. The new Captain was Phelipe Bicani whose wlfe Rosa and son Isidro also returned. The new mador was Hernando Jurana whose wife Rosa María accom-panied him back. The other Indians enumerated by Captain Díaz del Carpio were:

 

Men

Wives

Children

Bartholo

Catharine

 

Christoval Sivibuta

Rosa

 

Franscisco

Margarita

 

Francisco Tivtuburi

Juana

 

Juan

Xaviera

 

Miguel Tovpon

Ynes

2 sons aged 6 & 8

Joseph Ignacio

Nicolasa

1 son aged 6

Juan Antonio

Anna María

 

9 bachelors

 

 

 

There were also four widows living at Tubac, but no single girls nor smaller children (Díaz del Carpio Apr. 14 ff, 1752: 93v-94).

In July the parish priest Joachín Féliz Díaz visited Tubac and baptized two little girls. One was the daughter of Juan R. Siquimuri and Ines Bagio (Libro de Bautismos del Partido de San Ygnacio de Caburica p. 172). Since this couple was not enumerated by Captain Díaz del Carpio, they had evidently returned to Tubac since April. The little girl's 132godfather, Thomas Guamuquebari, was another apparent addition to the April returnees, raising the documented population to forty-four and suggesting an even larger one.

The other little girl baptized was the daughter of parents enumerated at Tubac in April, Miguel Tazpa (Tovpon in Díaz del Carpio's list) and Ingés Cabirestubu. Her godmother was Cathalina Tutucacuma (ibid.), probably the wife of Bartholo on the Captain's list.

As the summer crop season lengthened, the people of Tubac probably felt quite relieved to be back in their little rancheríaagain, but their relief was destined to be short lived, and within less than a decade they were to abandon Tubac again, leaving it to Spanish soldiers who were garrisoned in their midst.

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