Commanders of the Tubac Company, 1752-1776

F.

The Company of St. Ignatius at Tubac had only two titular commanders during its entire existence from 1752 to 1776. 223Captain Juan Thomas de Beldarrain led the new Upper Pimería Company to Tubac to found the post and retained command until his death. Captain Juan Bautista de Anza assumed command of the post early in 1760 and still held the title when it was transferred in 1776. Anza frequently left the post under an acting comandant while he campaigned against hostile Indians or explored or colonized for the Crown, and last of these, Lt. Juan M. Oliva, actually executed the transfer order.

Inasmuch as the comandant controlled his men and his post so minutely and with such considerable powers as to make it very much a reflection of his personality and capabilities, it seems worthwhile to devote some space to analyzing the duties of the position not already discussed and summarizing the qualities of the comandants.

1. Merchant Prince

The essential outlines of the commercial relationship between the post comandant at Tubac and his troops prior to June 1, 1774, have been drawn above. The administrative basis for the captain's peculiarly commercial position was the fact that he enjoyed a monopoly on provisioning his garrison.  The soldiers paid for their food, clothes, arms and mounts (Treutlein 1949:291). Actually their pay was turned over to the captain's account in the capital and the supplies they drew were charged against their accumulated pay. This 224eliminated the dangers of carrying large quantities of specie around the unsettled landscape of New Spain, but it made the post comandant a merchant and a bookkeeper as well as an army officer. In fact, merchants frequently secured commissions as post commanders just for that reason, paying twelve to fourteen thousand pesos for them at the capital, according to the Jesuit missionary Pfefferkorn. Naturally the military skill of such captains was entirely a matter of luck, and their general lack of it contributed to the continued success of hostile Indians (ibid., p. 294).

The price control system maintained by the King was designed to allow the post comandant approximately fifty per cent markup over the normal price of European or colonially manufactured goods at the City of Mexico. A peso and a half worth of cloth at Tubac, for example normally cost one peso at the Capital (ibid., p. 293). From this markup the Captain at Tubac had to pay for carrying the goods all the long distance from the City of Mexico to the post and compensate his commercial agent at the capital. This cut his profit well below fifty per cent, especially if the price of goods rose at the capital city.

As a rule the captain profited on the horses and provisions he provided for his garrison. During the years after the founding of the Tubac post, cavalry troopers supposedly maintained six horses apiece out of their pay. Captains Beldarrain and Anza procured horses in Sinaloa or farther south 225where horseflesh was abundant and relatively cheap. Still the horse charged to a trooper at twelve pesos represented only about a forty per cent mark up over his purchase price (ibid., p. 291-292). From this gross the captain had to pay his purchasing agents and the cowboys who drove the remount herds north the long miles to Tubac so his net profit per horse was relatively small. When an entire remount herd was lost to hostile Indians, the captain suffered a real financial loss, aside from the tactical difficulty created for his command. Captain Anza lost such a herd to the Seris in 1761 or thereabouts (Anonymous n.d. p. 215). To avoid such losses, the remount horses were guarded by troops once they reached dangerous territory, and after January 1, 1767, the Captain was under orders to reimburse the escort troopers for all their expenses incurred on such duty, including repair of equipment (Rubí Dec. 31,p 1766b), since the animals were his personal property and responsibility. Earlier the post commanders had used their troops for this personal service without recompensing them (Cota Dec. 22, 1766; Estrada Dec. 24, 1766; Martínez Dec. 24, 1766).

The markup allowed the Tubac captain on foodstuffs he purchased for his garrison seems to have been nearer one hundred per cent than fifty. A measure of maize meal charged to the trooper at six pesos usually cost the captain about three or even less if he had bartered his goods for it. Beeves were marked up in proportion (ibid., p.293).

226The Tubac comandant realized a significant profit from free trade with persons outside his unit. He was the principal source of manufactured goods for the citizens settled at the post and ranchers and miners living in the area. Civilian merchants were not fond of life on the rugged frontier, and clustered in the more southerly towns, principally large mine camps in Sonora. With his capital, the captain could purchase more supplies at the City of Mexico than his troops required and re-sell these outside the price control system since only his troopers were protected by the royal schedules (ibid., p. 293-294).

2. Indian Agent

While the garrison of the royal fort at Tubac had little to do in the way of campaigning against the pacified northern Piman Indians, the fort commander did have considerable responsibilities and many duties in the realm of friendly Indian affairs. With the northern Pimans at peace and allied with the Spaniards against the common southern Athapascan enemy, the job of the Tubac comandant in many ways resembled that of the British District Officer in native Africa, the Australian counterpart in highland New Guinea, or the United States army officer commanding a fort in Indian country prior to 1849 when Indian administration was taken from the War Department and placed under civilian control in the Department of the Interior. In other words on-the-spot 227administration of Indian affairs was part of the complex job of the Tubac comandant.

a. The Natives Leave. One of the earliest problems in Indian affairs faced by the original comandant of the Tubac post, Captain Juan Thomas de Beldarrain, was the relationship between his troops and the native Indians of the ranchería ofTchoowaka. Little direct evidence survives upon his handling of this problem, but sometime after their return to Tchoowaka in the spring of 1752 its natives migrated to the neighboring ranchería of Tumacacori. The latter was still avisita of Guebavi Mission at the time of the move which had been completed at some date prior to 1762 (Nentvig 1951:141). Quite likely the increment of population from Tubac helped to persuade the Franciscan friars to transfer the mission from dying Guebavi to Tumacacori in the early 1770's.

b. Mission Work. The military post was at times utilized by the local missionaries in their proselytizing efforts, especially in the aftermath of the Pima Revolt. The Jesuit missionary at Guebavi, Francisco Pauer, baptized five Indian children in Tubac on New Years Day of 1754 (Libro de Bautismos y Casamientos de los Pueblos...de Santa María Soamca, f. 9v). All the godparents were apparently Spaniards, two of them soldiers. Pauer seems to have been bent upon impressing his converts and establishing close ceremonial kinship ties between them and the Tubac Spaniards.

228After a trip north to Bac, Father Pauer repeated his use of the post for Indian baptisms on January 6, adding four more young souls to the fold (ibid., f. 11v). On March 28 Pauer combined forces with the parish priest, Br. Joachín Felis Díaz to baptize seven more little Indians (ibid., f. 12v-13).  This practice continued as late as May 1, 1755 (ibid., f. 18). The later function of the post in Indian social relations is discussed below under compadrazco system.

c. Indian Prison. The Spaniards continued to imprison northern Piman medical practitioners after the Pima Revolt, not knowing the distress and opposition this caused them or not caring. The new post at Tubac became the prison for holding Indians arrested in the northern communities. For example, one of the leaders in the rebel faction at St. Francis Xavier Mission at Bac in November-December of 1751 was being held prisoner at Tubac as a witch in the fall of 1754 (Chrisptovalo Oct. 19, 1754:88). This function of the Tubac post continued throughout the existence of the St. Ignatius garrison. The cost of Indian prisoners was being charged to company funds-that is, the Royal Exchequer-in 1775 (O'Conor Aug. 16, 1775) as in 1754.

d. The Gila River Pimas Rebel. After the pacification of the northern Pimans in 1752, the problems of the Tubac post comandant as principal local governmental agent in charge of those frontier Indians became acute to the point of open conflict at least twice more. Governor Juan Antonio de Mendoza 229stirred the Gila River Pimas led by Crow's Head-former comrade in arms of Captain-General Luís Oapicagigua-into rebelling in 1756. Pápagos also rose; Caborca was attacked in the west and Father Alonso Espinosa left Bac to take refuge in the royal fort at Tubac (Gardiner 1957:1). In November and December of 1756 Governor Mendoza campaigned against the Pápagos and Maricopas, carrying the fight all the way to the Gila River. He decisively defeated the Indians in a battle on their chosen field at the junction of the Gila with the Salt (ibid., p. 3-7).

e. The Pápagos Rebel. Since Juan Bautista de Anza was still serving at Fronteras as a lieutenant at the time of Governor Mendoza's campaign it is not likely he participated unless Fronteras troops were detached to the governor's force. It seems that the Pápagos rose once again, probably after Anza took command of Tubac in February of 1760. For Anza claimed credit for personally putting down a Pápago revolt by slaying the principal rebel chief and several other warriors with his own hands (Anza April 1770). This feat was mentioned in the post inspection reports of the Marques de Rubí so occurred prior to December of 1766 (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766).

This incident could not therefore have occurred in the spring Of 1770 when Anza again took a force into Pápago country as Rowland (1930:216 fn. 1) inferred.

The 1770 Incident arose while Captain Anza was serving in west central Sonora with the Elizondo Expedition. Captain230Urrea sent word from Altar that one of his officers scouting for Apaches ran onto half a dozen Pápagos with stolen stock.  The missionary in charge of Ati where they lived, suggested strong measures were required to whip the Indians into shape.  Elizondo gave Captain Anza sixty presidial troops and instructions to punish the guilty in the Pápago country and call for more troops if they were needed. Very shortly Anza had brought protestations of peace and loyalty from the northern Pimans living from Altar to the Gila River, so Anza went Apache-hunting (Rowland 1930:215-216) which was probably more to his liking.

f. Anza Talks Turkey. Another example of how the Tubac comandant functioned as an administrator of friendly Indians was Captain Anza's visit to Bac and Tucson in 1770 during his northern excursion from the Gulf Coast theatre. Eight years previously there had been a general exodus of Sobaipuris from the exposed eastern frontier along the San Pedro River to refuge with relatives at Santa María Suamca and Tucson and the other Santa Cruz River Valley settlements (Elias Gonzalez, Mar. 22, 1762). The Sobaipuri refugees at Tucson had been an unstable element in that settlement ever since, creating problems for the native Indians, the missionaries at Bac and the responsible presidial officer, Captain Anza of Tubac.

While the Spaniards generally favored the concentration of scattered Indian settlements into fewer larger towns more easily governed, they found this process proceeding beyond 231their desires in northern Piman Country by 1770. Very heavy mortality during epidemics and Apache attacks had seriously reduced the population of northern Piman country and declining ranchería populations coalesced with great frequency. The Spanish colonial policy of encouraging concentration in mission communities had hastened this process (Oapicagigua Mar. 24, 1752). But the process of coalition had progressed to the point of diminishing return, defensively speaking, by 1770, at least from the Spanish point of view. The Indians clearly felt that the larger the community the safer the individual, and they were all for continuing to combine settlements as population continued to fall. The Spaniards on the other hand wanted to freeze the existing settlement pattern for strategic reasons-further diminution in the number of Indian villages would open even wider gaps in the territory between towns, and make the Piman defensive screen even less effective as a buffer between the Apaches and the more settled parts of Sonora.

By the late spring of 1770 the Gila River Pima village with their large populations and efficient resistance to Apache attacks and abundant irrigation water looked like a better place to be than Tucson to the immigrant Sobaipuris (Ezell 1955:2 and Anza May 19, 1770:119). Late in April of that year at least three families left Tucson for the Gila River Pima settlements (Ezell 1955:2; Anza May 19, 1770:118). Captain Anza showed up at Tucson four days after their departure and persuaded the rest to stay put, issuing orders to the 232village governors to make those who had already moved return. Anza also showed the Indians where to build a fortifying wall for defense.

The Indians exacted a price for their cooperation with the Spanish official, however, demanding a church be built for them such as the other settlements had if they were to remain. What they actually meant, as much as the physical structure, was that they wanted food given them for their subsistence while they worked. Captain Anza arranged with Father Francisco Garcés to release all the harvest of the church fields at Tucson and half that grown at Bac to feed these importunate Indians, so they agreed to stay on and work on the fortifying wall and church (Ezell 1955:2 & Anza May 19, 1770:119).

As the responsible official field agent in Indian relations, Captain Anza had also to exercise his persuasive powers on his own hierarchical super-iors. The governor of Sonora interpreted one of Anza's reports on the Sobaipuri desire to resettle on the Gila River to mean they intended returning to their former homes on the San Pedro River-probably the governor's natural desire to re-establish the former military buffer zone there led him to read what he desired into what Anza actually had reported. Anza therefore had carefully to disabuse the governor and reaffirm the Sobaipuri interest in the Gila River, and their total disinclination to beard the Apaches by returning to the San Pedro (Ezell 1955:2 & Anza May 19, 1770:120).

3. Captain Juan Thomas de Beldarrain

The commanding officer of a Royal Spanish frontier fort was the single most important person in the garrison, and indeed in the whole settlement. His powers of command were nearly absolute, his social prestige was paramount and his economic powers were far-reaching prior to promulgation of the New Regulations of 1772.

The first commander of the Royal Fort of St. Ignatius at Tubac, Captain Juan Thomas de Beldarrain, was an experienced company commander when he was posted to the new Upper Pimería outfit in 1752. He was at that time commander of the Company of Sinaloa which had reached Sonora shortly before in the entourage of the interim governor of Sonora and Sinaloa, Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla.

Some time during the previous decade Captain Beldarrain had attracted favorable notice from the then-Visitor of Jesuit Missions, Father Juan Antonio Balthasar. So when the viceroy asked the latter, since become Provincial, for advice on the Pima Revolt emergency, the Jesuit recommended raising a new company and putting Beldarrain in command of it (Balthasar Jan. 18, 1752:9-10v). When the viceroy approved, Beldarrain's new job was assured.

Actually Beldarrain seems to have been something of a favorite of Governor Diego Ortiz Parrilla's so he might well have received the accolade anyhow, although he had a close rival in Lieutenant Bernardo de Urrea, militia officer from the San Miguel River Valley who was the first Spanish officer 235to reach San Ignacio Mission from the south after the revolt (Ewing 1945:265), the most efficient and active leader in the critical early days of the revolt and the hero of the Spanish victory at Aribaca (ibid., p. 273). Urrea received the command of the next company established, that at Altar.

As already indicated, Beldarrain's appointment as Comandant of the new Upper Pimería company was a temporary one until approved by the viceroy. Governor Diego Ortiz Parilla possessed only raised the fifty-man company:

today proceeding to the election of the captain who should command it, and who should be a respectable subject of known loyalty and obedience of conduct, valor, zeal and application to the royal service, whereas these and other commendable qualities and merits are united in the person of Don Juan Thomas de Beldarrayn, Captain of the Company of Sina-loa, I have found it well in the use and exercise of the superior aforesaid faculty to elect him for the present, in the royal name of His Majesty (whom God preserve):

I elect and name him as captain of said new company in order that he may use and exercise in all cases and matters the benefits and services according to the form that the other captains of forts of this government and Captaincy-General have and are entitled to, as much in whatsoever invasion by European enemies as by heathen or apostate Indians, disciplining said company and exercising in the management of arms, I order the lieutenant, ensign, sergeant, corporals of 236squads and soldiers of said company to have and hold said Don Juan Thomas de Beldarrayn for their captain, to revere, respect, obey and guard him, comply with and execute all orders he may give them orally as well as written, under the penalties which he may impose on those who are disobedient...for which I give him and confirm to him the necessary power and faculty (Ortiz Parrilla, Mar. 26, 1752a:50-51v.).

Since the viceroy's delegation of power to the governor specified that the captain chosen would have to repair to the City of Mexico for approval of his commission, Beldarrain soon had an agent intercede for him at the viceregal court to obtain confirmation of his title (Sanchez de Sierra Tagle 1752). This petition reached the viceroy early in August and the auditor reported favorably on confirmation on the twelfth (Altamira Aug. 12, 1752). Then the viceroy approved the commission withthat date (Revilla Gigedo Aug. 12, 1752).

News of this action probably did not reach Captain Beldarrain for at least a couple of months. Meanwhile the governor had ordered him out on an Apache campaign which he undertook in September, stopping at Fronteras to execute another errand for the governor. He collected additional testimony from Lieutenant Francisco Xavier de Escalante and Ensign Joséph de Moraga in regard to events during the Pima Revolt emergency (Beldarrain Sept. 11, 1752:121).

Beldarrain probably knew that the viceroy had confirmed his appointment by November 23 when he was at San Miguel de Horcasitas. He and an interpreter from Tubac sat in with 237the governor during the interrogation of a northern Piman leader testifying further on the causes of the recent rebellion (Oyctaitonic Nov. 23, 1752:244).

Governor Ortiz Parrilia's assiduous collection of information about the northern Piman rebellion continued into the following year and again on January 23, 1753, Captain Beldarrain participated in one of his sessions (Ortiz Parrilla Jan. 23, 1752). Stung into action by the governor's reports of Jesuit responsibility for goading the northern Pimans into revolt, the Visitor General of the Society of Jesus traveled about the church strongholds at the southeastern margin of Upper Pimería collecting testimonials favorable to his order. Captain Beldarrain made the trip to the mission at Santa María Soamca to appear before this worthy, Joséph de Utrera (Beldarrain Oct, 11, 1754) in October of 1754, the governor having ordered his subordinates to give the Jesuit official every requested assistance.

Juan Thomas Beldarrain shared the concern of most frontier fort commanders to enhance his personal financial position during his tenure as post commander. He acquired a number of Níxora and Apache slaves during his seven years at Tubac (Libro de Bautismos, Santos Angeles de Guebavi, p. 97, 98).

Captain Beldarrain built the commander's quarters at the fort of Tubac during his years in command (Croix Dec. 23, 1780:1). The original troops' quarters and headquarters building were also built or begun under his direction.

238There is little or no available documentation of Beldarrain's military activities during the later years of his command at Tubac. His career closed at Guebavi Mission on September 7, 1759, when he died after having received all of the last rites of the Roman Catholic Church from the Jesuit missionary, Francisco Pauer, who was twice his compadre, and who buried him at the foot of the altar in the church there (Santos Angeles de Guebavi, Libro de Entierros, p. 95 & Stoner 1937:37).

Captain Beldarrain married the daughter of a frontier provincial governor of the previous generation who was apparently a German but part of the fairly close-knit social elite which supplied the bulk of the officers for the frontier posts during the eighteenth century. His father-in-law had not onlygoverned Sonora from 1727 to 1735 (Rowland 1932:163), but had also led the formation of the mine camp at the rich Planchas de Plata silver strike the following year. That Beldarrain could marry such a man's daughter proves his own social credentials were of the highest.

Captain Beldarrain had at least one son, Phelipe, who chose a military career. Phelipe was born in 1750 and his father made an excellent choice of godfather for him-Juan Bautista de Anza (Bolton 1930:IV:511) who launched the youth in the officer corps after his father's death. Phelipe unfortunately proved unequal to the intricacies of accounting and was cashiered for financial mismanagement by Inspector General Hugo O'Conor (ibid. & O'Conor Aug. 18, 1775 & King239Aug. 31, 1776). He later served in the ranks of the Tucson company and eventually won promotion to an ensign's rank again (King Aug. 11, 1790). Another son of Captain Beldarrain may have been a Franciscan missionary, although this is a possibility and no evidence of relationship other than surname has been found. At any rate Fray Juan Baptista Beldarrain was the Franciscan at St. Francis Xavier at Bac from 1781 or 1782 (Franco 1782:1) until 1790, and initiator of construction on the present beautiful church building there (Yturralde Apr. 3. 1798:6v).

Several of Captain Beldarrain's daughters and sons contracted advantageous marriages with other families in the governing elite at Santa Ana where Beldarrain's widow moved her brood and her servants and slaves after his death in 1759 (Libro que contiene los de la administracion del Pueblo o Real de Santa Ana...Bautismos f. 2v, 3 & Libro de Entierros deste Pueblo de San Ygnacio...desde 1697, f. 6v).

The years at Tubac had not been without their heartache for the Captain and his lady. A son born to them in December of 1753 (Libro de Bautismos y Casamientos de los Pueblos de Visita ... de Santa María Soamca, f. 9) died shortly thereafter, for another son born March 6, 1755, was christened with the same name, Joséph Antonio (ibid., f. 17v). The crusty Jesuit Ygnacio Xavier Keller baptized him and Father Francisco Pauer became his godfather-and Beldarrain's compadre. Later Beldarrain's widow was to watch one of her daughters die at Santa Ana. This María Ignacia was the240youngest of the couple's children, born August 3, 1759 at Tubac (Santos Angeles de Guebavi, Libro de Bautismos p. 117) a little more than a month before her father's death, and she died at the age of eight (Libro de Entierros deste Pueblo de San Ygnacio... desde 1697, f. 71-71v).

NOTES RE: 240, 241GENEALOGICAL CHART OF THE BELDARRAIN FAMILY

1. Juan Phelipe Beldarrain, born 1750 (Oliva Aug. 13, 1775). Ensign at Tubac 1771-76; at Tucson 1776-77; cashiered. Re-entered service as soldier 1781; ensign 1790.

2. Luís María Beldarrain (relationship inferred), important land magnate at Fronteras (Archivo Historico de Sonora 411.11/2 folio 1.

3. Loreta de Ansa (Libro de Entierros deste Pueblo de San Ygnacio desde 1697, f. 6v).

4. Ygnacio Perez Serrana, Justicia of Santa Ana.

5. María Guadalupe de Beldarrain, died in childbirth on December 18, 1782 (Libro de Entierros deste Pueblo de San Ygnacio de 1697, f. 25) aged 36.

6. Joséph Antonio, born March 19, 1755 (Libro de Bautismos..de Santa María Soamca, f. 17v).

7. Juan Thomas de Beldarrain (the younger) citizen of Santa Ana.

8. Anna Gertrudis Cortés Monrroy, his wife.

9. Phelipe Salazar, citizen of Santa Ana.

10. Joséfa (María Joséfa Antonia Rita) de Beldarrain, born April 12, 1758 at Tubac (Santos Angeles de Guebavi, Libro de Bautismos, p. 113).

11. Died at Santa Ana on Sept. 11, 1772 (Libro de Entierros deste Pueblo de San Ygnacio desde 1697, f. 6v).

12. Born August 21, 1762 (Libro de Bautismos del Partido de San Ygnacio de Caburica p. 231).

13. Born at Santa Ana on April 12, 1779 (Libro que contiene los de la administration del Pueblo de Santa Ana, Libro de Bautismos, f. 3).

14. Born January 24, 1779, at Santa Ana (ibid., f. 2v).

4. Captain Juan Bautista de Anza

After Beldarrain's death in September of 1759, young Juan Bautista de Anza secured his appointment as comandant of the royal fort at Tubac on February 19, 1760 (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766) at the youthful age of twenty-five. He came to Tubac from a lieutenancy in the presidial company of Fronteras where he was born in 1735. Anza descended from a long line of Spanish frontier soldiers. His father had been killed in action by Apaches after twenty years as a presidial officer and a term as interim governor. His grandfather had commanded royal forts and been an officer on the northern frontier for thirty years (Anza Apr. 1770). The young captain's family ties bound him to many of the principal officers on the Sonoran frontier, to many clergymen and prominent businessmen.

As soon as he was old enough, Anza began to learn his trade in 1753 by on-the-job training at Fronteras, where served as a volunteer, supplying his own arms and mounts for two years (ibid.). Then he was appointed lieutenant at Fronteras on July 1, 1755 (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766). Whether by virtue of his inheritance or his training, Anza turned into one of the best of all frontier post commanders in the eyes of his men and his government.

These frontier captains were a tough and hardy lot-they could not have commanded the men they did under the conditions of warfare they faced day in and day out had they 243been otherwise. But of them all, Anza seems to have been the hardiest and the toughest. His military successes were compounded from sheer physical endurance, unlimited valor, instantaneous command decisions based on what appears to have been an unrivaled knowledge of enemy Indian tactics and thought-processes, plus a quality of leadership which gained him followers willing to fight with him up to the very gates of Hell if he decided to go there. Anza's leadership certainly was at least partly charismatic, yet it was based on a very firm foundation of unquestionable ability.

Captain Anza did not become entirely a paragon of virtue to his troopers, however willingly they followed him into battle. Around the post he was a hard man to live with-or more accurately it was hard to live around the post because Anza was absent so much of the time and possessed a major weakness for selecting incompetent subalterns. He failed to supervise his junior officers as closely as they needed. If Anza had a serious failing, it was this inability to find (or to countenance) subalterns as capable as he was. One suspects the great man could not brook competition in his own officer staff.

Dirty duty details such as remount herd guard were not apportioned equally among the Tubac troopers, nor with much regard to marital status. This irked the men. They also objected to unpaid service in the captain's personal household (Cota Dec. 22, 1766; J. M. Acuña Dec. 23, 1766; Martínez 244Dec. 24, 1766), but with human inconsistency they also objected to Anza's preference for one trooper in particular (Gabriel de Peralta) as his field striker (Martínez Dec. 24, 1766; Baez Dec. 26, 1766; Hurtado Dec. 27, 1766). Most irksome to the troopers were the violent punishments meted out by Ensign Huandurraga and Sergeant Marques. The soldiers particularly despised the officer for his abuse of his rank (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766).

Field Marshal Pignatelly y Rubí warned Anza that his failure to keep track of what went on at his post during his absences between officers and non-coms and the men could bring to naught all his other merits and abundant zeal (Rubí Dec. 31, 1766a).

Moreover the royal inspector ordered the captain to command the use of bare swords for disciplining troops to cease, and further ordered broken in rank any officer or non-com who continued this improper mode of punishment. The Field Marshal urged a diminution of all kinds of violent punishments and substitution of imprisonment as more effective. He restricted the use of violence to cases of forceful insubordination (Rubí Dec. 31, 1766b).

Captain Anza was not markedly better than other comandants of his time in preserving his post remount herds from Apache theft. In fact the Apache horse thieves seriously embarrassed Anza on the eve of both his California expeditions by running off his entire horse herd (Bolton 1930:I:64, 229). Soon 245after he took command at Tubac the Seris evened the score for his bravery in the 1760 campaign by running off the remount herd being conducted to his post (Anonymous n.d.:205). Anza spared little effort to replace worn out or stolen horses with good stock from big ranches farther south. Probably the Tubac soldiers were among the bestmounted troops on the Sonoran frontier during Anza's tour of command-when they had mounts!

One component of Anza's leadership was economic. Unlike other comandants who abused their commercial monopoly at their posts to gouge their troops at the highest rate permitted by royal regulations, Anza resold to his men the goods he stocked at prices significantly lower than the permitted maximum, and lower than the going rate at neighboring forts. The gratitude of Anza's troops for his economic fairness may be gauged from the size discount he gave them from the king's price scheduleas reported in December of 1766:

FORT OF TUBAC

PRICES WHICH THE REGULATION OF FORTS CONTAINS WITH EXPRESSION OFTHE REDUCTIONS MADE BY ITS CAPTAIN DON JUAN BAPTISTA DE ANZA IN THEINSPECTION REVIEW EXECUTED BY FIELD MARSHAL THE MARQUES DE RUBI

Reductions

 

Regulation

1 peso 2 reales

Pound of chocolate with sugar

1 peso 4 reales

3 p.

Yard of Mexican cloth

4 r.

246 3 p. 4 r.

The same of Querétaro

4 p.

5 r.

Yard of wide Puebla shirting

6 r.

4 r.

The same medium width

5 r.

5 r.

Yard of wide chapaneco

6 r.

4 r.

The same medium width

5 r.

2 p. 6 r.

Puebla skirts of every color

3 p.

2 p.

Fine Puebla rebozos

2 p. 6 r.

2 p.

The same, regular quality

2 p. 2 r.

10 p.

Mountain cloaks of cotton and silk

16 p.

8 p.

Half cloaks of the same

12 p.

4 r.

Pair of stockings or bootstockings of Toluca

5 r.

4 p.

Patio blankets

4 p. 4 r.

10 p.

Campeche blankets

11 p.

3 p.

Villa Alta blankets

3 p. 2 r.

3 p.

Coauttitlan sackcloth

5 r.

3 p.

Work hats, apiece

3 p. 4 r.

1p. 6 r.

ordinary quality of the same of medium heighth

2 p.

12 bars

Soap, 10 bars for 1 peso

10 bars

1 p. 2 r.

Men's shoes and women's cordovans

1 p. 3 r.

247 24 p.

Stock-working saddle trappings with all components

28 p.

3 p

Pair of saddle blankets

4 p.

3 p

Saddle hardware

4 p.

40 p.

Leather armor

50 p.

4 p.

Cordovan shoulder belts

5 p.

25 p.

Rifles

30 p.

9 p.

Rifle scabbards decorated with silk and agave thread

10 p.

3 p.

Firelock stocks

3 p. 4 r.

12 p.

Swords

14 p.

5 r.

Loose Scabbards for the same

6 r.

2 p.

Field knives with their sheaths

3 p.

5 p.

Pair of Magellan spurs

6 p.

2 p.

Copper pots & kettles

2 p 2 r.

2 p. 4 r.

Yard of Pekin goods

3 p.

2 r.

Yard of plain or figured ribbon

21/2 r.

5 p. 4 r.

Piece of light Bengal linen

6 p.

5 p. 4 r.

Pair of men's silk stockings in all colors

6 p.

3 p. 2 r.

Women's, the same

3 p. 4 r.

1 p. 3 r.

Yard of Rouen lace

1 p. 4 r.

7 r.

Yard of Silesian linen

1 p.

1 p.

Yard of colonial brown linen

1 p. 1 r.

1 p.

Yard of wide Leon linen

1 p. 1 r.

248 2p. 4 r.

Yard of scarlet

3 p.

2 p

Yard of English goods

2 p. 4 r.

1 p.

Yard of woolen goods

1 p. 4 r.

3 p.6 r.

Yard Of woolen worsted

4 p.

1 p.5 r.

Yard of Granada tafetta

1 p. 6 r.

4 p.

Yard of Valencia or Toledo satin

5 p.

14 p.

Mantles of Seville

16 p.

18 p.

Netting for the above

20 p.

5 p. 4 r.

Pair of Milan net stockings

6 p.

4 p. 6 r.

Pair of women's loomed net stockings from Italy

5p.

4 p. 6 r.

The same from Toledo

5 p.

1 p. 1 r.

The same from Ertambre for women

1 p. 2 r.

1 p. 1 r.

Pair of long-stockings from Seville or Genoa

2 r.

7 r.

The same from France or Galicia

1 p.

4 r.

Ounce of thread from Muñequilla

5 r.

2 r.

Small bound parcel of water-marked paper

21/2 r.

Anza's price-cutting so surprised the Marques de Rubí that he reported: "this act, which shows a generosity rare in these lands, makes this officer worthy of experiencing the effects 249of the royal gratitude" (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766). This did not by any means imply that Anza was a financial fool. Either by inheritance or his own efforts or both he was a comparatively wealthy man. During his tour at Tubac, he operated ranches at the former Indian rancherí a at Sópori (Narbona May 14, 1810:19), Sasabe, Divisaderos, Santa Barbara, Síbuta and Sicurisuta near the present international boundary as well as the old family holdings at Santa Posa de Corodéguachi (Yslas July 18, 1810:20). He could pay a thousand pesos for the captain's quarters which his predecessor had built (Croix Dec. 23, 1780). He imported and employed many Yaquis (Santos Angeles de Guebavi, Libro de Bautismos, p. 132).

The accounting required by all these commercial operations was staggering, but Anza supervised bookkeepers who kept perfect books. "Neither from the declarations which have been taken from everyone present in this company, nor in my own examination of its account books of everyone for all the time this company has existed in charge of this captain, has there been encountered the very least suspicion of prejudice to the company by overcharging, contrivance nor discounting, from which the least grievance could arise. On the contrary..." reported the Marques de Rubí (Dec. 21, 1766) with evident pleasure.

Another component of Anza's effectiveness was his realistic appraisal of the proper strategy and tactics for fighting Indians. Anza was a firm believer in using Indian 250auxiliaries in fighting either Apaches or Seris. He made every effort to employ Pima Indians during his campaigns (Anza Mar. 17, 1766:109 against Apaches; Anza Nov. 10, 1769:116 against Seris), and eventually succeeded in having ten Opatas attached to the Tubac garrison as permanent Indian scouts. He also recruited twenty additional Opatas during the Seri War (Medina May 3, 1779 No. 3). This unprecedented extravagance Anza had to defend against all the doubts of higher officials with less perception of the requirements of Indian warfare (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775), but the Opata scouts remained part of the company until it was relocated at Tucson and Anza was governor of New Mexico. Then the Adjutant-Inspector ordered all thirty Opata scouts demobilized, an action approved by the Comandant-General of the Frontier Provinces (Medina May 3, 1779 No. 3 and annotation).

A related aspect of Anza's command capacity was a thorough knowledge of the Sonoran terrain. Anza was young as fort commanders went, but when Colonel Domingo Elizondo arrived in Sonora in 1768 with regular army troops to break the resistance of the Gulf Coast Indians, he found Anza's acquaintance with the country was the most extensive of all the frontier officers (Rowland 1930:141). Anza's later success in taming hostile Indians while governor of New Mexico proves that the secret of this knowledge was quick learning and earnest study, for Anza had not served in New Mexico before going there to govern the province.

251The forebears of Juan Bautista de Anza were devout Roman Catholics and he seems to have been no exception. His father had been a great help to the Jesuits in establishing their new missions in 1732 (Hammond 1929:228) and four years later offered to take the elderly pioneer Jesuit Joséph Agustin de Campos into his home when the old man was removed from his mission at San Ignacio under canonical obedience (Dunne 1941:57).

The third Juan Bautista de Anza took the spiritual welfare of his troops seriously. He had married a girl whose brother was a priest, and Anza induced Joséph Manuel Díaz del Carpio to come to live at Tubac as a presidial chaplain, paying him with a special tithing arrangement under which each soldier contributed a percentage of his pay (J. M. Acuña Dec. 23, 1766; Cota Dec. 22, 1766; Martínez Dec. 24, 1766; Hurtado Dec. 27, 1766). This proved to be only a temporary solution, and most of the time the fort personnel depended upon the missionary stationed at Guebavi and later at Tumacacori.

Captain Beldarrain may have been less churchminded than Anza despite his close relationship with Father Francisco Pauer, or he my not have wished to spend his own money to provide the post with a church building. In any event Anza and his brother-in-law started the first church building at Tubac (Tamarón 1937:305 & Urrutia 1766) very likely at Anza's expense.

252Captain Anza's merits were appreciated by colonial officials long before he achieved fame by his Californian expeditions. The Marques de Rubí reported to the king's secretary after his 1766 inspection:

As for the conduct of the first two [Anza and Bernardo de Urrea] it seems that the voluntary proof of their fairness makes them very commendable, especially Don Juan Bautista, whose creditable quality has been found very well illustrated in the review of his company, adding his good will, application, and well known valor, which make him worthy not only of being given the commission which he does not have as captain, but also of being preferred in the thanks which His Majesty may deign to dispense to him (Rubí Feb. 21, 1767).

The king's inspector of frontier posts was so impressed with Captain Anza's merits and good intentions that he took the trouble to write him a long letter of instructions and almost fatherly advice on matters military (Rubí Dec. 31, 1766a).

Juan Bautista de Anza's opening of a land route to California and colonization there are summarized below, and have been published upon in detail by Herbert E. Bolton. His career as governor of New Mexico has been adequately reported by Alfred B. Thomas. The story of his later service as Comandant of Arms in the Frontier Provinces remains to be pulled together from Spanish archival sources. Inasmuch as these later periods of Anza's life involved a much broader field of action than Tubac, they are not discussed here.

5. Lieutenant Juan María Oliva

When Captain Juan Bautista de Anza departed for Upper California on January 6, 1774, he left in command of the royal fort of St. Ignatius at Tubac Lieutenant Juan María Oliva, an old man of fiftynine years (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775). Lt. Oliva was an illiterate (Medina May 3, 1779 No. 6) native of the Villa of Sinaloa (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775). A veteran of the original Tubac garrison (Ortiz Parrilla, Mar. 26, 1752c: 47), Oliva had served his king since September 4, 1749 (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775) and worked his way up through the ranks. Needless to say, he did not belong either by birth or marriage (Santos Angeles de Guebavi, Libro de Bautismos p. 124) to the provincial elite of Sonora. On the other hand he was living proof that upward social mobility was possible in Spain's colonies, at the same time that he proved the inherent limitations on the degree of such mobility.

Oliva was the original sergeant of the Tubac Company (Ortiz Parrilla, Mar. 26, 1752c:47) and had won his commission on June 5, 1754. He was promoted from ensign to lieutenant July 7, 1758 (Rubí Dec. 21, 1766) by Captain Beldarrain without even viceregal approval.

Lt. Oliva was a splendid Indian fighter and was apparently highly esteemed by Captain Anza as such. He had eight wounds to prove his bravery by 1766 (ibid.) and had made over 100 campaigns with Anza and Beldarrain by the time Anza left him in charge of Tubac (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775) when he claimed over fifteen wounds (Oliva Aug. 13, 1775 No. 8).

254Oliva seems to have functioned very well as second in command to the energetic, intelligent, and sophisticated Anza, or even as a leader of small detachments on active battle or scout duty. As a sergeant in October of 1752 he had personally slain an Indian village chief. Another time he surprised and captured 110 Indians. He repulsed some 200 Apaches who assaulted Mission St. Francis Xavier at Bac while he led a detachment guarding it (Oliva Aug. 13, 1775 No. 8). When Colonel Domingo Elizondo arrived in Sonora in 1768 to extirpate the Gulf Coast hostiles, one of the first local experts on Indian warfare he consulted was Oliva, who'd been at Guaymas (Rowland 1930:140).

Left on his own with command responsibility for the whole company and post, Oliva fell considerably short of the Anza mark, and the garrison deteriorated during Anza's absence. This loosening of discipline had not progressed seriously during the four and a half months Anza required to find a land route to the Pacific Ocean and return to Tubac, but then the Adjutant Inspector assigned him to command Terrenate almost as soon as he returned, and he then departed for the City of Mexico to report to the viceroy in person as previously arranged.

During seven months of Lt. Oliva's interim command, however, the Tubac post had deteriorated very fast. By August it was in such bad shape that the Comandant-Inspector issued a sharp reprimand to the acting comandant:

255The deplorable state in which I have found the company which garrisons this fort during the inspection review which I have just made of it is quite notorious... (O'Conor Avg. 16, 1775).

The royal inspector went on to command exact obedience to his orders for the reform of the post, usurping to some extent the function of the absent post comandant, Captain Anza. One suspects Lt. Oliva suffered more than a little because the refugee Irish Inspector General was consumed with more than a little envy over the great success achieved by a mere colonial captain named Anza in finding a land route to Upper California.

Among his strict injunctions to Lt. Oliva, Comandant-Inspector O'Conor included one to improve the discipline of the unit and begin drilling it in the use of firearms, in close-order drill and broken formation field manouvres and silent operations (ibid.). Another measure to improve the morale of the Tubac troopers appeared in O'Conor's orders to Lt. Oliva. The abuse of detailing soldiers for duties not in the royal service was to end, ruled the Comandant-Inspector (ibid.), just like the Marques de Rubí nine years earlier. The isolation of the post and powers of command clearly bred contempt for the letter of royal law.

Just how O'Conor expected to be able to put the Tubac post to rights by issuing written orders to the illiterate Lt. Oliva is somewhat of a puzzle. At least his pronouncements 256looked good in the record, and the homeless Irish rebel had to keep the record very much in mind here on the far frontier of the Spanish Empire which sheltered him.

Before Anza returned to Tubac again discipline had deteriorated further to the point where there were "disorders", (Bolton 1930:IV:138) at the post which enabled the Apaches to run off the entire horse herd of some 500 animals. In the few days now-Lieutenant Colonel Anza had at Tubac from October 15 to 23, 1775, while final preparations were made to start the colonizing expedition toward California, he could hardly have remedied the situation, even if he had not had his hands full with the thousand and one details of the expedition.

Upon Anza's departure command of the post again reverted to Lt. Oliva, and early in the next year 1776 it fell his lot to transfer the garrison from Tubac to the Indian village called Tucson where it became the Company of the Royal Fort of St. Augustine at Tucson (ibid., IV:28).

When that new post was inspected in 1779 by Adjutant-Inspector Roque de Medina, the inspector discovered almost no progress had been made in fortifying it and he laid responsibility to Lt. Oliva because of his illiteracy and to Ensign Juan Phelipe Beldarrain for his dishonesty in handling company funds. Medina placed Phelipe Beldarrain under arrest (Medina May 3, 1779, No. 6). Meanwhile Lt. Oliva had been relived of command on February 11, 1777, by Captain Pedro de Allande y Saavedra (ibid.) and placed under arrest by 257his successor (Allande June 15, 1777). When Comandant-Inspector Hugo O'Conor had inspected the Tubac company in 1775, he had perceived Oliva's unfitness for independent command, and recommended his immediate retirement (O'Conor Aug. 10, 1775), but the Spanish colonial bureaucracy moved as slowly as any other so it was a year and a half before a new comandant was chosen and arrived at the post.

During this period Oliva was retired with the rank of captain as a reward for his long and faithful services in the Sinaloa-Pimería Alta-Tubac-Tucson company (King Charles III, Feb. 28, 1776 & Medina May 3, 1779, No. 8, 14). Even after his retirement Oliva couldn't keep out of a cavalry saddle. In June of 1780 he was campaigning on the San Pedro River with the military governor of Sonora. At the age of sixty-five, Oliva still possessed the sharpest eye in the outfit, spotting a smoke that enabled the Spaniards to capture the only prisoners taken during the campaign (Croix June 23, 1780).

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